When Russia initiated its invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago, President Joe Biden articulated three primary aims for the U.S. response. Notably absent from these aims was the explicit goal of securing a Ukrainian victory. The administration’s stance was encapsulated in the vague phrase of supporting Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” raising questions about the specific objectives this support was intended to achieve.
“We deliberately avoided discussing specific territorial outcomes,” explains Eric Green, a former member of Biden’s National Security Council who oversaw Russia policy at that time. Essentially, the U.S. did not commit to aiding Ukraine in recovering all territories lost to Russia, particularly the large regions in eastern Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, which were annexed during the initial invasion in 2014. Green emphasizes that the White House assessed that such aspirations exceeded Ukraine’s capabilities, even with significant Western backing. “That scenario was unlikely to produce a successful outcome. The main objective was to ensure Ukraine remained a sovereign, democratic state, free to pursue its integration with the West.”
These were among the three objectives laid out by Biden. The second focused on maintaining unity among the U.S. and its allies, while the third aimed to avoid direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. Reflecting on his leadership during the ongoing Ukrainian conflict—an issue likely to shape his legacy—Biden has effectively achieved these three aims. Nevertheless, this limited success does not bring a sense of fulfillment, even to his closest allies and advisers. “Sadly, it’s the kind of success that leaves one feeling dissatisfied,” Green remarked in a conversation with TIME. “The suffering experienced by Ukraine and the uncertainty about the ultimate outcome weigh heavily on everyone.”
As the conflict has evolved, Ukrainian frustration with Biden has intensified, becoming more vocal, especially following the U.S. presidential elections that resulted in Donald Trump’s victory. In a podcast released in early January, President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed that the U.S. has fallen short under Biden’s leadership in imposing sanctions on Russia and providing Ukraine with essential weapons and security assurances. “With all due respect to the United States and the administration,” Zelensky told Lex Fridman, “I don’t want to go through another experience like we had with Biden. I urgently request sanctions and weapons—right now.”
The bluntness of his critique is particularly notable, considering the considerable support the U.S. has provided to Ukraine during Biden’s term—totaling $66 billion in military aid alone since the Russian invasion in February 2022, according to the U.S. State Department. When including all forms of assistance Congress has approved for Ukraine’s economic, humanitarian, and other needs, the total reaches approximately $183 billion as of last September, as reported by Ukraine Oversight, a U.S. government watchdog established in 2023 to monitor this aid.
However, Zelensky and some of his allies argue that the U.S. has been overly cautious in its approach to confronting Russia, particularly concerning a clear pathway for Ukraine to join NATO. “It is essential that we share a unified vision for Ukraine’s security future—within the E.U. and NATO,” the Ukrainian president asserted during his recent visit to the White House in September.
During that meeting, Zelensky presented Biden with a detailed list of requests he called Ukraine’s “victory plan.” This plan sought not only an invitation to NATO but also a significant enhancement of Ukraine’s military capabilities through a substantial influx of weaponry and the authority to use them deep within Russian territory. At that point, Biden had announced he would not seek re-election, leading Ukrainians to hope that his status as a lame duck would empower him to make bolder decisions, partly to solidify his foreign affairs legacy. “For us, his legacy is a crucial consideration,” a senior member of Zelensky’s delegation communicated to TIME. “How will history assess you?”
The responses to these requests were mixed. On the topic of Ukraine’s NATO ambitions, Biden remained steadfast in his stance. However, he did approve several actions that had previously been considered too risky by the White House. In November, the U.S. allowed Ukraine to use American missiles for strikes deep into Russian territory. In January, the Biden administration imposed stringent sanctions on the Russian energy sector, including measures against the “shadow fleet” of tankers that Russia employs to transport its oil.
While these actions did not fully meet Zelensky’s expectations, they enabled Biden to assert in his final foreign-policy address that the U.S. had fulfilled its objectives in defending Ukraine. Nevertheless, he remained cautious, avoiding making promises that Ukraine would reclaim any further territory or even endure the conclusion of the conflict. “So far, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not succeeded in subjugating Ukraine,” Biden declared in his January 13 address at the State Department. “Today, Ukraine stands as a free and independent nation, with the potential—for a promising future.”
The future envisioned by Zelensky and many Ukrainians is one where Russia is decisively defeated. However, Biden’s implicit message, as he rallied global support, was that defending Ukraine against Russia does not necessarily mean defeating Russia. Thus, it is understandable that such an ambitious objective continues to remain out of reach for Zelensky.
